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When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of 
effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, 
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and similarity to be meaningful is that a perfectly congruent measure creates a higher benefit than an 
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most practical purposes, notions of responsiveness and similarity are not informative about the tradeoff 
between insurance and allocation. In order to understand this trade-off, task difficulty has also to be 
taken into account. 
 
Keywords: hidden action, multitasking, incentives 
 
JEL Classification: M41, M52, J33, D82 
 
Acknowledgements   
The author wishes to thank Uschi Backes- Gellner, George Baker, Oliver Fabel, Paul Grout, Matthias 
Kr¨akel, J¨org Oechssler, Dirk Sliwka, J¨org Budde, Ernst Maug, Anne Pommier, Alfred Wagenhofer, 
and participants at the CMPO seminar in Bristol, the Kolloquium f¨ur Personal¨okonomik in Z¨urich, 
the Symposium zur ¨okonomischen Analyse der Unternehmung in Frankfurt and the Annual Meeting 
of the Verein f¨ur Socialpolitik for helpful discussions. 
 
Address for Correspondence 
Department of Economics 
University of Bristol 








The activity of a manager who carries out various tasks is often reﬂected
in a rich set of accounting and other data. If the employer of the manager
wants to link the manager’s pay to his performance, such multi-dimensional
information needs to be aggregated into a single performance measure as
forcefully argued by Jensen et al. (2004). There are diﬀerent ways of aggre-
gating the information leading to diﬀerent performance measures. Some of
these measures may be better than others. But which measure should the
employer use?
Before addressing this question, we want to examine what the employer
knows. Typically, she has a fair idea about the inﬂuence of the manager
on the variation of the performance measure. In other words, she knows
how responsive the measure is. Speciﬁc concepts which formalize this notion
is the sensitivity-precision concept (Banker and Datar, 1989), the signal-
noise ratio (Kim and Suh, 1991), the mean-preserving spread of the likeli-
hood (Kim, 1995) and the risk-minimization component (Feltham and Wu,
2000). Another piece of information that is often available to the employer
is how well the measure reﬂects her beneﬁt from the activity. The idea of
similarity between measure and beneﬁt is embodied in the concept of con-
gruity (Feltham and Xie, 1994), discongruity (Datar et al., 2001), distortion
(Baker, 2000), congruence (Baker, 2002) and non-congruency (Feltham and
Wu, 2000). Here, we are interested in how useful performance measure char-
acteristics like responsiveness and similarity are when deciding what measure
to use.
Suppose there are two performance measures that aggregate the avail-
able data diﬀerently: the ﬁrst measure perfectly reﬂects the beneﬁt of the
employer; it is congruent with the beneﬁt while the second is not. Both
are equally aﬀected by factors beyond the control of the manager; they are
equally responsive. Is the congruent measure preferable to the non-congruent
one? Here, we show that the answer is “no” for most cases of practical rele-
vance.
There are two eﬀects which determine the usefulness of a performance
measure: how much eﬀort can be bought without imposing too much uncer-
tainty on the manager (an insurance problem) and how this eﬀort is allocated
1across tasks (an allocative problem). The insurance problem is often thought
to be related to the responsiveness of the measure and the allocative prob-
lem to its similarity with the beneﬁt (Feltham and Xie 1994, Baker 2000,
Feltham and Wu 2000, Baker 2002). If responsiveness indeed reﬂects how
much eﬀort can be bought and similarity how well this eﬀort is allocated,
then a measure should generate higher surplus if it is more responsive. Like-
wise, more similarity with the beneﬁt should lead to a larger surplus. In
particular, a congruent measure should be preferable to an equally respon-
sive non-congruent measure. This superiority of a congruent measure is thus
necessary for performance measure characteristics to reﬂect insurance and
allocative considerations.
It is a priori not clear why the trade-oﬀ between insurance and alloca-
tion can be reﬂected by characteristics of the performance measure. Neither
this nor the superiority of congruent measures over equally responsive non-
congruent measures has been proven.1 In a single task model, Kim and Suh
(1991) show that a larger signal-noise ratio (more responsiveness) indicates
lower agency costs (higher surplus) and Kim (1995) obtains a similar result
for the mean-preserving spread. If the manager fully controls the variation
of the measure (maximal responsiveness), Datar et al. (2001) ﬁnd that mea-
sures with lower discongruity (higher similarity) lead to a larger surplus. So,
in absence of multiple tasks more responsiveness is better and in absence of
noise, more similarity is preferable. Unfortunately, these results do not help
us to answer what happens if there are multiple tasks and the measure is
noisy at the same time; the proofs by Kim and Suh (1991), Kim (1995), and
Datar et al. (2001) do not extend to this case. Moreover, Datar et al. (2001)
demonstrate with an example that care has to be taken when generalizing
from the single-task to the multiple-task model:2 a higher sensitivity (more
responsiveness) may actually decrease the attractiveness of a congruent per-
formance measure. 3
Another relevant question is whether performance measure characteris-
tics like responsiveness and similarity provide enough information. Can we
1It has not even been formalized what a “good” allocation of a given eﬀort is.
2See also the distinction between congruent and incongruent sensitivity by Banker and
Thevaranjan (2000).
3In this example, however, they vary the beneﬁt and sensitivity at the same time and
it is hence not possible to isolate the eﬀect of the change in sensitivity.
2ignore how diﬃcult the manager ﬁnds which task? If the manager is in full
control of all relevant variables and these variables are combined to form a
congruent performance measure, it is possible to devise an incentive scheme
such that the manager fully internalizes the employer’s beneﬁt and the ef-
ﬁcient solution is reached. This case is an example where task diﬃculty
does not inﬂuence the design of optimal incentives. If the manager is not in
full control and requires insurance, internalization will be partial. This may
lead the manager to neglect costly but beneﬁcial tasks. Should the incentive
scheme not correct for this by focusing attention on such tasks? If yes, a
performance measure that emphasizes these tasks would be preferable to a
congruent measure and task diﬃculty would inﬂuence the optimal design.
Most of the models dealing with multiple task problems and featuring
some notion of responsiveness and similarity assume that all tasks are ex-
actly equally diﬃcult. According to Feltham and Wu (2000) who draw on
Wu (1995), this is an innocuous assumption as “results are substantially the
same”.4 The assumption is sometimes justiﬁed on the grounds that the units
in which the manager’s activity is measured are arbitrary. Rescaling these
units (say from hours to minutes), it is possible to obtain a problem with
equalized and independent marginal costs. Following this argument and the
prevailing practice in the literature, task diﬃculty does not seem to matter
for the trade-oﬀ between insurance and allocation. This suggests, it can be
ignored when choosing a performance measure.
In order to check whether task diﬃculty aﬀects the choice of the per-
formance measure, we use the multiple-task principal-agent model by Holm-
str¨ om and Milgrom (1991) in the form popularized by Feltham and Xie (1994)
and allow for costs to diﬀer and interact across tasks. We introduce this
model in Section 2. There are several notions of similarity between mea-
sure and beneﬁt (Feltham and Xie 1994, Baker 2000, Feltham and Wu 2000,
Datar, Kulp and Lambert 2001, Baker 2002), which exist for this model.
All these notions agree that a measure is congruent with the beneﬁt if the
systematic eﬀect of the manager on the measure is a multiple of that on the
beneﬁt. In geometrical terms, the vector of marginal eﬀects on the mea-
sure and on the beneﬁt have the same direction. Currently, there is only one
notion describing responsiveness in this model: the risk minimization compo-
4see footnote 4 on page 168 in Feltham and Wu (2000)
3nent by Feltham and Wu (2000). This concept has two drawbacks: it requires
the employer to know the optimal activity in the absence of contractual con-
straints (ﬁrst-best activity) and it does not reduce to the signal-noise ratio of
Kim and Suh (1991) when there is only a single task. As an alternative, we
build on the ideas of Banker and Datar (1989) and Kim and Suh (1991) and
deﬁne a multiple-task signal-noise ratio as the (inner vector) product of the
marginal eﬀects of the manager on the measure (signal) divided by the vari-
ation beyond the control of the manager (noise). This deﬁnition is perfectly
in line with Baker (2002), who ﬁxes the length of the marginal eﬀect vector
and the variance of the noise term in order to hold responsiveness constant.
We begin the analysis, in Section 3, by considering the case where tasks
are equally costly and ﬁnd the conventional wisdom conﬁrmed: a perfor-
mance measure with a given signal-noise ratio generates the highest surplus
only if it is congruent. So, for the speciﬁc case of equal costs our question
is answered: the congruent performance measure is always preferable. Any
trade-oﬀ between notions of similarity and responsiveness implicitly takes this
result for granted; here, it is proven for the ﬁrst time. The result crucially
depends on the notion of responsiveness: if the risk minimization component
by Feltham and Wu (2000) is used instead of the signal-noise ratio, the mea-
sure which maximizes surplus is not necessarily congruent.
In Section 4, we leave the restrictive setting of exactly equal costs at
all tasks. The second and central ﬁnding is that if marginal costs diﬀer,
a performance measure with a given signal-noise ratio no longer maximizes
surplus when it is congruent. The vector of marginal eﬀects of the optimal
performance measure may even be almost orthogonal to that of the beneﬁt.
It is irrelevant for this result how responsiveness is precisely deﬁned: the
generated surplus always depends on the diﬃculty of tasks and so does its
maximizer when ﬁxing a quantity that does not depend on this diﬃculty
(e.g. the signal-noise ratio as deﬁned here or the risk minimization compo-
nent by Feltham and Wu 2000). Task diﬃculty does matter for the choice of
the optimal performance measure and hence notions of responsiveness and
similarity cannot capture the trade-oﬀ between insurance and allocative con-
siderations; the idea that characteristics of a performance measure may be
used to determine its consequences on the amount and allocation of eﬀort is
thus conﬁned to the rather limited case of identical costs.
4The diﬃculty of tasks has hence to be taken into account when selecting a
performance measure. But how? It is not possible to take the original prob-
lem with diﬀering costs, transform this problem to the identical-independent
cost setting by rescaling eﬀort, and carry out comparisons and trade-oﬀs
in the usual fashion because the signal-noise ratio is not invariant to such
rescaling. In Section 5, we explore a diﬀerent way and adjust the notion of
responsiveness for costs. We prove that when comparing performance mea-
sures with the same cost-adjusted signal-noise ratio, the maximal surplus is
generated by a congruent measure, again.
In the ﬁnal section, we summarize our results, discuss them and examine
their implications.
2 The model
Consider the designer of an incentive scheme in a multiple task setting, who
wants to choose the best performance measure in order to provide incen-
tives to an agent (e.g. manager) who creates a beneﬁt for a principal (e.g.
employer). We follow the literature and use the working horse model of mul-
tiple task principal-agent analysis (see Feltham and Xie 1994, Baker 2000,
Feltham and Wu 2000, Banker and Thevaranjan 2000, Datar, Kulp, and
Lambert 2001, Baker 2002) to relate to this literature and to obtain simple
closed form solutions. This model was initially devised by Feltham and Xie
(1994) by using the assumptions of the single-task linear-exponential-normal
(LEN) model by Spremann (1987) in the multi-task agency problem of Holm-
str¨ om and Milgrom (1991).




where β0 = (β1,...,βn) is a vector of coeﬃcients and η is a noise term
with mean zero. The noise term reﬂects inﬂuences on the beneﬁt beyond the
control of the agent. Likewise, performance measures (which can be regarded




5where b0 = (b1,...,bn) is a coeﬃcient vector and  is a normally distrib-
uted noise term with expected value zero and variance σ2. This noise term
captures any eﬀects on the performance measure that cannot be inﬂuenced
by the agent. The noise which inﬂuences the beneﬁt may stand in an arbi-
trary relation to the noise inﬂuencing the performance measure: it may be
independent, correlated or identical ( = η). Hence the description of the
performance measure encompasses the special case that it is identical to the
beneﬁt (b = β and  = η).
Next, we link the coeﬃcient vector of the performance measure to that
of the beneﬁt.
Deﬁnition 1 (Congruence). Performance measure and beneﬁt are congru-
ent if their coeﬃcient vectors have the same direction: b = γβ for some γ
diﬀerent from zero.
This deﬁnition relates to various congruity concepts: congruent perfor-
mance measures minimize the discongruity of Feltham and Xie (1994), the
non-congruency by Feltham and Wu (2000), the distortion by Baker (2000)
and the incongruity of Datar et al. (2001) while they maximize the congruence
of Baker (2002). Thus, congruent performance measures are an important
benchmark case in all similarity concepts.
It is customary in the multitasking literature to assume that the wage is
linear in the performance measure: W(P(e)) = w0+w1P(e). This simplifying
assumption is not innocuous because the optimal incentive scheme in the
single-task case is non-linear (Mirrlees, 1999). However, linearity can be
justiﬁed under certain additional assumptions about the timing of decisions
(Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom 1987 and Hellwig and Schmidt 2002). While the
principal is supposed to be risk-neutral, the agent has a negative exponential
utility function U(v) = −e(−vr), where v := W(P(e)) − C(e) is the income
of the agent and r is the Arrow-Pratt measure for risk aversion. It is usually
assumed that costs are quadratic and that marginal costs are identical across
tasks (Feltham and Xie 1994, Baker 2000, Banker and Thevaranjan 2000,
Feltham and Wu 2000, Datar, Kulp, and Lambert 2001, Baker 2002).5 Here,
we examine the more general case of diﬀering and interrelated marginal costs:
C(e) = e
0Ce,
5There are a few (unpublished) exceptions such as Wu (1995) and Ratto (2006).
6where the matrix C = (cij) is assumed to be symmetric and non-negative
deﬁnite, so that costs are always positive: e0Ce > 0 if e 6= (0,...,0)0. The
more speciﬁc cost function normally used can be obtained by setting C = 1
2I,
where I is the identity matrix.
Which concept should we use for responsiveness? We want to rely on the
results of Kim and Suh (1991) for the single-task case and hence introduce
a generalization of their concept to the multi-task model.
Deﬁnition 2 (Signal-noise ratio). The signal-noise ratio is the ratio of the
inner product of the expected marginal eﬀect of activity on the measure divided












In the single-task case, b is a real number and the signal-noise ratio reduces
to that deﬁned by Kim and Suh (1991) and is equivalent with the product
of sensitivity and precision considered by Banker and Datar (1989).6 The
deﬁnition of the signal-noise ratio reﬂects the idea that a longer coeﬃcient
vector means that the respective performance measure is more susceptible to
changes in eﬀort and thus more “informative”.7 On the other hand, ﬁxing
the ratio between the squared length and the variance implies that two per-
formance measures with the same signal-noise ratio are somehow “equally
blurred by noise”. Compare for example two measures, (b,σ2) and (˜ b, ˜ σ2),
where the second is similar to the ﬁrst but twice as sensitive to changes in
eﬀorts: ˜ b = 2b. Then, this higher sensitivity only translates into an advan-
tage if the second measure is less than twice as noisy : ˜ σ < 2σ; if it is exactly
twice as noisy, the signal-noise ratio is the same and the two measures are
equivalent in the sense that the consequences of using one measure can be
perfectly replicated by using the other measure and adjusting the wage rate.
Note that even if they have the same signal-noise ratio, performance mea-
sures may still emphasize diﬀerent eﬀort dimensions. In other words, the
6Banker and Datar (1989) also suggest a a signal-noise ratio for multiple signals. This
suggestion does not concern us here, as we are supposing that the information of various
signals is already embodied in the performance measure.
7Presumably, this is the reason why Baker (2002) ﬁxes this length to illustrate his idea
of congruence.
7allocative properties are not yet determined.
After having introduced congruence and signal-noise ratio as characteris-
tics of the performance measure, we want to return to the agency problem.
What is the maximal surplus that principal and agent can obtain when they
cannot contract on eﬀort? For the answer, we follow the standard procedure
(see e.g. Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-Castrillo 1997) of assigning the role of the
mechanism designer to the principal and let her receive any beneﬁt from the
operation of the incentive scheme. An incentive constraint represents the ra-
tionality of the eﬀort choice of the agent. Finally, a participation constraint
ensures that the beneﬁt is indeed generated by the mechanism and not by
exploiting the agent; for convenience, we standardize the certainty equiva-
lent of the outside option to zero, so that the respective utility is minus one.
Overall, the maximization program takes the form:
max
w0,w1
E(B(e) − w0 − w1P(e)) (1)
such that e ∈ argmax˜ eE(U (w0 + w1P(˜ e) − C(˜ e))) (2)
and E(U (w0 + w1P(e) − C(e))) ≥ −1. (3)
Thanks to the model assumptions, we can solve this maximization program
and ﬁnd the optimal (linear) incentive scheme for any performance measure
P, where it is convenient to parameterize this performance measure in b
and the signal-noise ratio ρ rather than in b and σ2. Note, that the two
parameterizations are completely equivalent.
Lemma 1. Given a performance measure with weights b and signal-noise
























8The proof for this lemma is an extension of the standard proof to more
general costs and can be found in Appendix A.
As we expect, a higher Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion r or a lower
signal-noise ratio ρ reduces the performance pay rate w∗
1. Interestingly, the
optimal wage rate also depends on the costs C. Generally, higher costs lead
to a lower wage rate but more importantly, the cost matrix enters the re-
lationship between b and β. This implies that the wage rate may change,
simply because the relative importance of tasks for the performance measure
or the beneﬁt is diﬀerent. Thus, the relative weights for eﬀort may determine
to what degree a performance measures is used.
Lemma 1 allows us to quickly assess the surplus generated by a perfor-
mance measure characterized by (b,ρ). It thereby enables us to search for
the optimal coeﬃcient vector and to check whether it is congruent in the
next section.
3 Equal marginal costs across tasks
If the various notions of similarity are informative about a good allocation
of eﬀort across tasks, the highest surplus amongst measures with the same
signal-noise ratio should be generated by a congruent measure. Formally, we
can ﬁnd the optimal measure by maximizing the surplus (as computed in
equation (6)) in b while ﬁxing ρ. This leads to the following observation.
Proposition 1. Suppose costs for tasks are equal (C = c · I, where c is a
positive real number). Consider only measures with the same signal-noise
ratio ρ. Then, the measure which maximizes the surplus φ(b,ρ) is congruent.
The proof of this proposition is less obvious than the expected and simple
result suggests (see Appendix B). Trade-oﬀs between insurance and alloca-
tion can only be reﬂected in performance measure characteristics when more
similarity is better for given responsiveness. The proposition thus brings
partial relief to various models which illustrate such trade-oﬀs using notions
of similarity and responsiveness (Feltham and Xie 1994, Feltham and Wu
2000, Baker 2000, Baker 2002). The relief is only partial for two reasons.
First, we only consider the benchmark comparison between a congruent and
a non-congruent performance measure. If the respective similarity concept
9is indeed useful, more similarity should also generate a higher surplus when
comparing several non-congruent measures with the same signal-noise ratio.
Such comparisons have to be carried out using the respective notion of sim-
ilarity. Introducing all these concepts and comparing them seems a lengthy
exercise and due to space constraints, we refrain from doing so. It might,
however, prove useful in order to discriminate between the diﬀerent concepts
of similarity. The second reason why the relief is only partial is that not
all notions of responsiveness can be employed. If the signal-noise ratio is
replaced by the risk-minimization component by Feltham and Wu (2000),
the resulting measure is not necessarily congruent (see Appendix C).
4 When costs diﬀer across tasks
As the assumption of equal costs merely simpliﬁes the analysis and as it
is still possible to obtain closed form solutions if costs diﬀer and interact,
we relax the assumption and move to the more realistic situation that the
agent ﬁnds working on some task easier relative to other tasks. Although
the problem gets more involved, the optimal performance measure can still
be computed (the respective details are in Appendix D). It turns out that if
cost diﬀerences are present, the ﬁnding of Proposition 1 is not valid anymore.
Proposition 2. Given arbitrary costs (e.g. C 6= c · I) and considering all
performance measures with the same signal-noise ratio ρ, the performance















In fact, the optimal coeﬃcient vectors may be almost orthogonal. Con-





Using the formula in Proposition 2, we ﬁnd that the optimal performance
measure has the coeﬃcients:
b
∗











10Suppose that the eﬀort on the ﬁrst task is more costly (c > 1). Then, the
optimal performance measure puts more emphasis on the cheap eﬀort rela-
tive to a congruent measure. The more risk-averse the agent or the lower the
signal-noise ratio of the performance measure, the stronger is the focus on
the cheap task. Imagine that the bulk of the beneﬁt is created by the ﬁrst
task β1 = 1 −  whereas the second task only contributes a little: β2 = .








ρ+r . This implies that for increasing costs c and
decreasing signal-noise ratio ρ, the relative importance of the ﬁrst eﬀort in
the optimal measure shrinks to zero although the relative importance of this
eﬀort for beneﬁt creation is rather high. The principal does not only prefer
a non-congruent to a congruent performance measure with the same signal-
noise ratio but the emphasis on tasks in the measure may have very little to
do with their importance for the creation of beneﬁt.
Thus generally, the principal does not choose a congruent measure (b =
γβ) but prefers a particular non-congruent measure. If we do not want to
restrict the analysis to speciﬁc beneﬁt functions,8 a congruent performance
measure only maximizes the surplus if costs are identical across tasks. This
result can be derived by asking when the optimal performance measure b∗ is
a multiple of β (β∗ = γβ for some real number γ) in the above proposition;
a full analysis is in Appendix E.
Corollary 1. Given any beneﬁt coeﬃcient vector β and signal-noise ratio ρ,
congruent performance measures maximize the surplus if and only if costs are
identical and independent along all eﬀort dimensions: C = I ·c, with c ∈ I R.
This result is valid independently from the speciﬁc notion of responsive-
ness. Any such notion, whether signal-noise ratio, risk minimization compo-
nent or any other characteristic of the performance measure, is independent
of costs. The surplus, however, does depend on costs (see equation (6)) and
so does its maximizer under a side-constraint which is independent of costs.
The results in this section imply that unless the designer knows costs to
be identical and independent, the trade-oﬀ between insurance and allocative




, it also maximizes the surplus – even if costs are not identical and inde-
pendent.
11considerations is not reﬂected in performance measure characteristics. Thus,
the practical value of using and weighing these characteristics seems rather
limited.
5 Incorporating task diﬃculty
The last section presented the slightly puzzling ﬁnding that under diﬀerent
costs, non-congruent and even almost orthogonal performance measures cre-
ate a higher surplus than congruent performance measures with the same
signal-noise ratio. In this section, we will identify the source of this ﬁnding
and suggest a way to establish the optimality of congruent measures even in
the presence of diﬀerent costs.
There are two possible sources for the puzzling ﬁnding. First, congruent
performance measures are simply not leading to the optimal allocation of ef-
fort across tasks under second-best conditions. Second, the signal-noise ratio
is not appropriate to control for the insurance problem. In this section, we
argue that the latter explanation is valid.
Recall that the optimal wage-rate, w∗
1, depends on the composition of the
performance measure – even if its Euclidean length
√
b0b is kept constant.
However, there is no reason why the wage rate should vary when facing the
same insurance problem. The only reason for the wage rate to change is when
the performance measure imposes more (or less) uncertainty on the agent.
This already hints to the fact that the signal-noise ratio may be insuﬃcient
to capture the insurance problem. Further indication comes from the exam-
ple with the almost orthogonal measure, which was discussed in the previous
section. To obtain an almost orthogonal optimal performance measure, we
either had to increase risk-aversion or decrease the signal-noise ratio. Both
quantities are clearly related to the insurance problem. Using the same ex-
ample, it can also be illustrated why the signal-noise ratio does not fully
capture the insurance problem. Even though the signal-noise ratio is ﬁxed,
the mechanism designer can choose a measure which emphasizes a particular
task. This does not only imply that the agent focuses on this task, it also
means that this task can be better measured: the controlled variation with
respect to this task increases relative to the uncontrolled variation (which
stays constant). So, while the overall controlled variation, as represented
12by the length of the performance measure, does not change, the controlled
variation along a particular dimension may very well change. Consequently,
relatively less uncertainty is imposed on the agent and the performance wage
rate can be increased. In essence, a trade-oﬀ between allocation and insur-
ance occurs and a “bad” allocation is accepted for a less noisy payment to
the agent despite our attempt to eliminate such trade-oﬀs by holding the
signal-noise ratio constant.
Independent and identical costs represent a knife-edge case, where trade-
oﬀs between insurance and allocation do not matter once the signal-noise
ratio is ﬁxed. This suggests to adjust the signal-noise ratio for costs in order
to re-establish the results from the equal cost case. We want to lay the
foundation for such an adjustment by considering a broader class of signal-
noise ratios.
Deﬁnition 3 (modiﬁed signal-noise ratio). The modiﬁed signal-noise ratio
is the ratio of the squared length of the marginal eﬀect measured using some
arbitrary norm M divided by the variance of the noise: ρM := b0Mb
σ2 , where
M is some positive deﬁnite matrix.
But which norm M should be chosen? Is there a particular choice which
allows us to re-establish optimality of congruent measures? How is this choice
related to costs? The following proposition provides the respective answers
(proof see Appendix F).
Proposition 3. Within the class of performance measures with signal-noise
ratio ρM, congruent measures maximize the surplus if and only if M = C−1.
Thus, we have to use the modiﬁed signal-noise ratio ρC−1 := b0C−1b
σ2 if
we want congruent measures to be optimal. Moreover, even if we do not
limit attention to modiﬁed signal-noise ratios and consider more general any
notion of responsiveness, this notion has to depend on costs if we want to re-
establish the optimality of congruent performance measures (see Appendix
G).
An alternative way to deal with diﬀering costs seems to be to re-scale ef-
fort in such a way that costs become equal and independent. We would hope
that we can then rely on Proposition 1 and congruent measures are again
attractive. Unfortunately, the signal-noise ratio is not invariant to rescaling.
13Thus, even when the problem is transformed, we cannot work with the or-
dinary signal-noise ratio but have to use a cost-adjusted version of it (see
Appendix H).
Cost-adjusting whatever notion of responsiveness we wish to use has a
major drawback. It requires parameters that are likely to be private infor-
mation of the agent. While it is possible in a single task setting to compare
the quality of measures by looking alone at its characteristics, we know al-
ready that the multiple-task setting also requires information on how beneﬁt
is created. In the general case, which we have considered here for the ﬁrst
time, even that is not suﬃcient: agent’s preferences also need to be known.
The value of a performance measure in a general multi-task setting is hence
highly context speciﬁc: it depends on parameters of the principal (in form of
β) and on parameters of the agent (in form of C).
6 Conclusion
Is it possible to decide between performance measures on the basis of their
characteristics? Insurance and allocative considerations are often identiﬁed
with the responsiveness (signal-noise ratio, precision, risk minimization com-
ponent) of a performance measure and its similarity to the employer’s beneﬁt
(congruity, discongruity, congruence, non-congruence). If this identiﬁcation
is justiﬁed, congruent performance measures are better than equally respon-
sive non-congruent measures. Here, we checked whether this simple intuition
holds and gained the following insights.
First, if all tasks are exactly equally diﬃcult, congruent measures are
more attractive than equally responsive non-congruent ones. This result is
often taken for granted; here, we have formalized and proven it for the ﬁrst
time. The result is not valid for all notions of responsiveness: it holds when a
multi-dimensional version of the signal-noise ratio is used but not for the risk-
minimization component by Feltham and Wu (2000). The result provides a
necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for similarity and responsiveness to
be informative criteria when designing incentives. It only tells us that a con-
gruent measure generates the highest beneﬁt and not that a measure with
higher similarity to the beneﬁt yields more surplus. The validity of this more
general statement depends on the speciﬁc deﬁnition of similarity. Future re-
14search could address the question for which notion of similarity (congruity,
discongruity, congruence, non-congruence, etc.) more similarity implies a
higher surplus when responsiveness is held constant. This might prove useful
to decide which of these notions is most suitable to describe the eﬀect of a
measure on the quality of eﬀort allocation.
Second, once the task diﬃculty is not the same across tasks (marginal
costs diﬀer), the measure which generates the largest surplus amongst all
measures with the same signal-noise ratio is not congruent. Congruent mea-
sures are no longer preferable to equally responsive non-congruent measures;
it is no longer possible to compare measures on the basis of their charac-
teristics; and the trade-oﬀ between more and better allocated eﬀort can no
longer be reﬂected by notions of responsiveness and similarity. Respective
illustrations in the literature are thus conﬁned to the rather special case of
independent and identical costs.
Third, the information that is required to ﬁnd optimal incentives seems
to increase in the complexity of the contractual environment. In a single-task
model with a risk-averse manager and risk-neutral employer, the signal-noise
ratio suﬃces to rank diﬀerent measures; details of the preferences of the em-
ployer or manager do not matter. It has been an important achievement of
the literature initiated by Feltham and Xie (1994) to point out that prefer-
ences of the employer are important once there are multiple tasks. It has,
however, been neglected that the manager’s preferences are equally impor-
tant. In multiple task models, the value of performance measures depends on
who is using the performance measure and for whom it is used. Accordingly,
the designer needs to be informed about beneﬁts and costs – information that
may be diﬃcult to obtain. If the employer designs the scheme, the manager
has all reason to misrepresent his costs and as they are multi-dimensional it is
hard if not impossible to elicit them with a menu of contracts. If the manager
designs the scheme, he often does not know how diﬀerent tasks inﬂuence the
employer’s beneﬁt. So, overall incentive design in the multiple-task context
is based on rather strong informational requirements.
Fourth, in the case that the employer knows the preferences of the man-
ager, we suggest a way to incorporate them. The notion of responsiveness
(here the signal-noise ratio) needs to be modiﬁed in a speciﬁc way. Then, the
comparison between congruent and non-congruent measures becomes mean-
15ingful again. A seemingly attractive alternative would be to re-scale eﬀort
in order to have identical costs across tasks and to carry out comparisons in
the transformed problem. This, however, is not possible because the trans-
formation alters the signal-noise ratio. In order to consider the same class of
performance measures, the signal-noise ratio needs to be once more adjusted
for costs – albeit in a diﬀerent way. It is hence simpler to directly work with
the modiﬁcation of the signal-noise ratio in the untransformed problem.
Fifth, we identify the reason why a congruent measure does not maximize
the surplus amongst all measures with the same signal-noise ratio. As the
optimal measure puts more and not less emphasis on cheap tasks, the reason
cannot be that the manager should be drawn towards costly but beneﬁcial
tasks. Rather, it has to do with a trade-oﬀ between insurance and eﬀort
allocation that is not reﬂected by the signal-noise ratio and the similarity
of the measure to the beneﬁt. It is possible to increase the inﬂuence of one
task and lower the inﬂuence on others while leaving the signal-noise ratio
constant. Such a change improves insurance properties but distorts alloca-
tion. For the knife-edge case of equal and independent costs, these two eﬀects
exactly outweigh each other. But if costs are lower on some task, allocating
eﬀort towards this task leads to smaller losses than before and the insurance
outweighs the allocative eﬀect. Again, the speciﬁc notion of responsiveness
is not crucial. As long as ﬁxing responsiveness does not fully determine the
allocation across tasks but leaves some freedom, it will not completely re-
ﬂect the insurance side of the problem. The explanation why non-congruent
measures are optimal thus brings us back to the central theme of this article:
the designer of incentives has to take costs into account when trading-oﬀ
insurance and allocation of eﬀort.
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A Proof for Lemma 1
Using the linearity of the performance measure, the normality distribution of
the noise, and the shape of the utility function, the base wage can be chosen
to compensate the agent for any harmful eﬀects of uncertainty (w0 = C(e)−
w1b0e + w2
1rb0b
ρ ), so that the participation constraint can be eliminated from
the program (see e.g. Salani´ e 1998). Recalling the deﬁnitions of performance
measure, beneﬁt, and costs, as well as the risk neutrality of the principal, the












such that e ∈ argmax˜ e E(U (w0 + w1b
0˜ e − ˜ e
0C˜ e)).
(7)
Consider the eﬀort choice problem of the agent for a given incentive scheme
(w0,w1) (side constraint). Because the utility function is monotonic in the re-







The objective function is concave because the second derivative is a symmet-
rical, negative deﬁnite matrix (−C). Thus, the maximizer can be determined






Note, that C−1 exists because C is positive deﬁnite. Replacing e in equation
(7) by the optimal eﬀort from equation (8) yields the following expression



























Using the optimal wage rate in (9) ﬁnally results in the surplus from an








B Proof of Proposition 1
Several steps in the proof are also needed to prove other results in this article.
We summarize these steps in the following lemma.








∗ = k · (CH)
−1 β, with k ∈ I R
	
.
19Proof. Proof. Because H is symmetric and positive deﬁnite, we can decom-




2P 0. Now, deﬁne ˜ b := H
1
2b, so that
b = H− 1








To advance on this problem, we ﬁx the length of ˜ b to some arbitrary value k2:
˜ b0˜ b = k2. By varying k, we will later obtain the set of all possible solutions.
The respective Lagrangian for a given k is:








2˜ b − λ

˜ b






















The ﬁrst condition is an eigenvalue problem; to obtain ˜ b∗, we have to ﬁnd
the eigenvalues λ of the matrix (H− 1
2)0C−1ββ0C−1H− 1
2. By deﬁning x :=
(H− 1
2)0C−1β, the matrix can be re-written as xx0 and it becomes apparent
that the matrix is symmetric and of rank one. Due to the latter, there can
only be one non-zero eigenvalue. Hence, this value is identical to the trace






where EV(·) denotes the eigenvalue and tr(·) is the trace-operator. Replacing





Obviously, ˜ b∗ = kx is a solution to this problem. Again due to the rank
of xx0, it is also the only solution. To recover the solution in the original
















The set of all solutions is then obtained by letting k vary.
20We can now employ this lemma to ﬁnd the maximizer of the surplus for
a given signal-noise ratio. In order to do so, we set C = I and H = I(1+ 2r
ρ ).
Then, the quantity in the lemma becomes the surplus and this surplus is










β, with k ∈ I R
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elements of this subset still maximize the surplus but they also fulﬁll the
constraint of having signal-noise ratio ρ. Moreover, they are multiples of the
vector β and hence congruent performance measures. Consequently, con-
gruent performance measures maximize the surplus for a given signal-noise
ratio.
C Risk minimization component
Feltham and Wu (2000) suggest to measure the noise resulting from a per-
formance measure by a risk minimization component, which is deﬁned in
equation (8) in their article. In the case of a single performance measure
considered here and in our notation, this component is:





where eFB is the eﬀort vector in the ﬁrst-best situation, i.e., when eﬀort e can
be legally enforced. This eﬀort equals the beneﬁt coeﬃcient vector eFB =







The surplus generated by a performance measure in the case considered by
































21Holding S constant, the surplus no longer depends on β and consequently
the maximizer of the surplus will not depend on β. Accordingly, the optimal
performance measure is independent of the beneﬁt of the principal. Thus
there are no restrictions placed on the shape of the performance measure
in relation to the beneﬁt and it does not matter for surplus maximization
whether it is congruent or not.
D Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this result relies again on Lemma 2 which we stated and proved





is symmetric and positive deﬁnite.





and solve the un-











β with k ∈ I R
)
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Not all these maximizers have the required signal-noise ratio of ρ. However,

















are also maximizers on the restricted set and are hence a solution to the
restricted maximization program.
E Proof of Corollary 1
For a congruent performance measure to maximize surplus, it must hold that
b∗ = γβ for any β. By Proposition 2, this is equivalent to (2r
ρC + I) = Iκ,
where κ is any real number (The choice of κ is not limited because the stan-
dardization factor k neutralizes any choice). Thus, congruent performance
measures maximize surplus if and only if C = I κ−1
2
ρ
r for any κ. In other
words, costs must be a multiple of the identity matrix: C = cI, where c is
some positive real number c := κ−1
2
ρ
r. Note that c > 0 because C is positive
deﬁnite by deﬁnition.
22F Proof of Proposition 3
We express the surplus in terms of the modiﬁed signal-noise ratio, so that H
becomes H = (C−1 + M 2r
ρM). Applying once more Lemma 2 from Appendix










β, with k ∈ I R
)
.
Thus, by a similar argument as in the proof for Corollary 1, b∗ will only be
a multiple of β if M = C−1.
G Impossibility to eliminate agent’s costs
Is there any way to control for noise while ignoring agent’s costs such that
congruent performance measures maximize surplus?




˜ b0˜ β˜ β0˜ b
˜ b0(I + 2RC)˜ b
,
where R is some component capturing the uncertainty properties, e.g. R =
rσ2 or R = r r
ρ. By Lemma 2 with H =0 (I+2RC), the performance measure
maximizing this surplus is
˜ b
∗ = k (C(I + RC))
−1 ˜ β.
Congruence would require that ˜ β = k (C(I + RC))
−1 ˜ β. This equation is
never going to hold for arbitrary ˜ β unless R depends on C.
H Rescaling
Can we transform a problem with arbitrary costs to a problem with identi-
cal and independent costs and do trade-oﬀs and comparisons in this simple
world? The answer is no. The problem of ﬁnding the optimal performance
measure while responsiveness is ﬁxed is not invariant to rescaling because
rescaling aﬀects the responsiveness of a performance measure.
23Lemma 3. If we re-scale eﬀorts in a problem with arbitrary costs C 6= I
such that costs become identical and independent, the signal-noise ratio does
not stay constant: the problem of ﬁnding the optimal measure amongst all
equally responsive measures is not invariant to rescaling.
Proof. Proof. If we want to ﬁnd some linear transformation ˜ e = Te such
that
C(e) = e
0Ce = ˜ e
0˜ e = ˜ C(˜ e),




2 is some decomposition of the positive




2 = C. Using this transformation, we get
B(e) = β0e +  = β0C− 1
2˜ e +  = ˜ B(˜ e)
P(e) = b0e +  = b0C− 1
2˜ e +  = ˜ P(˜ e),
and the beneﬁt coeﬃcient vectors in the transformed problem is ˜ β := (C− 1
2)0β
while the measure coeﬃcient vector becomes ˜ b := (C− 1
2)0b. The signal-noise
ratio in the transformed problem is
˜ b0˜ b
σ2 = b0C−1b
σ2 while the signal-noise in the
original problem was b0b
σ2. Since C 6= I, the signal-noise ratio thus changes.
Consequently, the side-condition in the maximization problem changes and
hence the maximization problem itself is not invariant to rescaling.
In order to ensure that the same problem is solved before and after rescal-
ing, the signal-noise ratio has to be rescaled, too. Only if we consider mea-
sures with
˜ b0C˜ b




σ2. Using this altered signal-noise ratio, we ﬁnd that
congruent performance measures maximize surplus. So, we cannot just take
the problem with diﬀering costs, transform the problem to identical costs,
and do the usual trade-oﬀs in the familiar setting but we have to adjust the
signal-noise ratio for costs. Note that this adjustment is diﬀerent from the
adjustment in Proposition 3.
24